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NOTE
Easement Holder Liability Under CERCLA: The Right Way to
Deal with Rights-of-Way
INTRODUCTION

Responding to growing publ,ic concern about the accumulation of
toxic wastes, Congress in 1980 passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 1
CERCLA authorizes federal action to clean up, or to require others to
clean up, leaking hazardous waste sites. 2 Congress placed the financial
burden for this cleanup on those responsible for the problem3 and on
those who benefited from improper methods of hazardous waste disposal.4 Through this liability scheme, Congress also intended CERCLA
to encourage responsible or benefited parties to respond voluntarily to .
the hazardous waste problem. 5
CERCLA imposes liability on four categories of people: present
owners or operators of a hazardous waste facility, persons who owned
or operated the facility at the time of the waste disposal, generators of
the hazardous waste, and transporters of the hazardous substances. 6
Facility is defined broadly to include almost any structure or area in
which hazardous substances are disposed, stored or located. 7 CER1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988)).
2. CERCLA § 104(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(l) (1988).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS [hereinafter 198Q U.S.C.C.A.N.] 6119, 6124-6125.
4. s. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1979), reprinted in 2 SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 525 (1982) [hereinafter SUPERFUND].
5. Congress intended "to induce [responsible] persons voluntarily to pursue appropriate environmental response actions with respect to inactive hazardous waste sites." H.R. REP. No.
1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 3, at
6119, 6120.
6. Under CERCLA covered persons include:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated
any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility
or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal
or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there
is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance ....
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
7. CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988).
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CLA has been interpreted as imposing strict liability on those falling
within these four categories of responsible parties. 8 If no responsible
party can be found, a "Superfund" established by CERCLA pays for
cleanup costs.9
The third party, or innocent landowner, defense narrows slightly
the expansive reach of CERCLA. CERCLA does not impose liability
on potentially responsible parties who can show the release or threat
of release of a hazardous substance was caused solely by "(1) an act of
God; (2) an act of war; [or] (3) an act or omission of a third party
other than ·an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose
act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship ...."and that they "exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned . . . ." 10 Additionally, the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), 11 which amended
CERCLA in 1986, granted further protection to the innocent landowner by narrowing the definition of contractual relationship to exclude some relationships which formerly had been encompassed by the
term. 12 On the other hand, SARA also imposed an additional requirement for invoking this defense: a landowner cannot have actual or
constructive knowledge of the existence of hazardous waste on the
property. The landowner can avoid liability by proving due diligence
in investigating possible environmental hazards prior to purchasing
the land. 13
Courts have faced difficulty in determining whether an entity is an
8. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 893 (E.D.N.C. 1985); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984). For
further discussion of strict liability under CERCLA, see infra notes 31-33 and accompanying
text.
9. CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988). The Superfund also underwrites cases in which
the responsible parties do not agree to pay and the government finances the cleanup, later suing
to recover the costs. See CERCLA §§ 104, 111, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9611 (1988). Taxes levied on
major petroleum and chemical facilities and general funding finance the fund. See 26 U.S.C.
§§ 59A, 4611-4612 (1988).
10. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982).
11. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1616 § lOl(f), codified as amended at CERCLA
§ 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988).
12. CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988).
13. See CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A) (1988):
The term "contractual relationship", for the purpose of section 9607(b)(3) of this title, in·
eludes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instruments transferring title or
possession, unless the real property on which the facility concerned is located was acquired
by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the
facility, and one or more of the circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also
established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and had
no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or
threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by escheat, or
through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise of eminent
domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.••.
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owner for the purposes of CERCLA liability. The statute circularly
defines the term stating that an owner or operator is a person owning
or operating a facility. 14 Some courts have interpreted Congress' definition of owner broadly, focusing on the degree of control necessary to
constitute ownership. Following this method of analysis, courts have
extended ownership liability to some lenders, 15 lessees, 16 parent corporations, 17 and corporate shareholders and officers, 18 when their degree
of control passed a certain threshold. Thus far the courts have not
decided whether the same reasoning would apply to easement holders
who exercise or have the right to exercise a sufficient degree of control
over the land subject to the easement. As of yet, no case has raised
this issue. 19
Because easements, especially those of utilities and railroads, often
cover large tracts of land, the question of whether an easement holder
can be liable as an owner under CERCLA looms on the horizon. Hazardous waste sites already have been discovered on property subject to
easements,20 and quite likely will be found again on such property. In
some cases, the easement holder probably exercises dominion over the
land to almost the same degree as the owner of a fee simple estate:
This Note argues that in these instances easement holders should face
14. Owner is defined in conjunction with operator:
The term 'owner or operator' means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore
facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility,
title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency,
abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who
owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand.
Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a
vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the
vessel or facility.
CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). Because CERCLA was hastily
drafted, it poses more interpretation problems than many other statutes. See, e.g., Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
("Superfund'? Act of 1980, 8 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (1982) ("In the instance of the
'Superfund' legislation, a hastily assembled bill and a fragmented legislative history add to the
usual difficulty of discerning the full meaning of the law.") (adapting lA F. GRAD, TREATISE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW§ 4A.04[2] (1981)).
15. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,
1985); see also infra section 111.B.
16. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C.
1984), affd. in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 853 F.2d 160 (4th
Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); see also infra section III.A:
17. Colorado v. ldarado Mining Co., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,578 (D. Colo.
Apr. 29, 1987); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho, 1986); see also infra
section III. C.
18. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (supplemental memorandum opinion) (president of company and owner of 93% of corporate stock held
liable as owner); see also infra section 111.C.
19. But see infra note 105 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
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liability as owners under CERCLA unless they fall within the scope of
the innocent landowner defense.
Part I asserts that CERCLA's legislative history, when read
against the language of the statute itself, supports liability for easement holders as owners under CERCLA. Part II contends that, based
on common law and statutory law regarding their general liabilities,
easement holders should be found liable as owners under CERCLA if
they exercise sufficient control over the land subject to the easement.
Part III analogizes to other CERCLA decisions which have broadened the concept of ownership, and argues that easement holders
should fall within this wide category. Part IV argues that policy considerations, such as risk spreading and monitoring of hazardous waste
sites, suggest that liability should be extended to easement holders.
This Part also responds to arguments that interpreting CERCLA to
impose liability on easement holders would be unfair or economically
inefficient. Part V offers an example of an easement holder who, based
on the analysis of this Note, meets the criteria for ownership under
CERCLA. This Part also suggests a way of mitigating the harsh consequences of finding this easement holder to be an owner. Finally, this
Note concludes that easement holders whose control of the land subject to the easement crosses a certain threshold should be considered
owners under CERCLA. In some cases, however, these holders
should be entitled to greater protection under the innocent landowner
defense than that afforded fee simple owners.
I.

CERCLA's LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

This Part examines CERCLA's sketchy legislative history and argues that based on the language of bills introduced prior to the passage
of CERCLA and the final wording of the statute itself, the term
"owner" in CERCLA can be interpreted as including easement holders. Additionally, this Part contends that the policy considerations
underlying the drafters' choices also support liability of easement
holders as owners in some situations.
CERCLA's definition of owner21 does not supply obvious help in
interpreting this term since it merely states that an owner or operator
is an owner or operator. However, the Comprehensive Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Liability and Compensation Act (H.R.
85), 22 one of the forerunners of CERCLA, defined owner as "any per21. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). See supra note 14.
22. H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 26,369-74, 26,378-86 (1980). Congress
struggled for six years to pass legislation addressing the problem of oil spills and hazardous waste
releases. Although the bill ultimately enacted was a hastily drafted and rapidly passed compromise measure, Congress previously had considered carefully four major bills and several minor
ones dealing with the issue. None of these bills passed both the House and the Senate. CERCLA, however, incorporated features of all these bills. See 1 SUPERFUND, supra note 4, at xiiixxi. H.R. 85, the first of these bills, imposed liability on owners or operators releasing oil, 96th
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son holding title to, or in the absence of title, any other indicia of ownership of a vessel or facility. " 23 According to the Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, this definition encompassed those
possessing evidence of ownership equivalent to title. 24 This explanation indicates that in drafting CERCLA's precursors, Congress contemplated nontraditional owners.
Although the exact wording of H.R. 85's definition of owner was
not retained in the final bill, arguably its spirit still remains. 25 No
qualifications are attached to CERCLA's definition of the term
"owner,' such as a requirement of title. In fact, both CERCLA and
H.R. 85, in nearly identically worded phrases, exclude from the definition of owner one who, "without participating in the management of a
vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
security interest in the vessel or facility." 26
The choice of "indicia of ownership" rather than the more succinct
"title" suggests that there are people or entities which have "indicia of
ownership," but not title, and that some of them would be considered
owners if this exclusion did not exist.27 Otherwise the exclusion would
be phrased to eliminate title holders rather than those having "indicia
of ownership."
When one considers the exclusion juxtaposed against the definition
it was drafted to accompany, that of H.R. 85, the breadth of the term
"owner" becomes obvious. Even if having characteristics of an owner
does not suffice, control accompanied by manifestations of ownership
results in liability. An easement holder possesses many of the traits of
an owner; she can use the land, albeit in a restricted fashion, sell or
devise the easement and often can exclude others from using the easement.28 When these abilities combine with control over the property
Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CoNG. REc. 26,371 (1980), or certain hazardous substances. H.R. 85, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CoNG. REc. 26,379 (1980).
23. H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CoNG. REc. 26,370 (1980), reprinted in 1
SUPERFUND, supra note 4, at 31 (emphasis added).
24. H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 36 (1979), reprinted in 1 SUPERFUND,
supra note 4, at 35.
25. Alternatively, Congress may have intended the courts to defer to the common law definition of "owner," or to develop a new common law definition for CERCLA based on its roots in
tort law. Part II demonstrates that easement holders exercising sufficient control should be
treated as "owners" under such a scheme.
'In the absence of a substantive definition of "owner'' within CERCLA, one must look elsewhere for its meaning. CERCLA's legislative history and the common law are two of the most
logical places to search.
26. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988); see also H.R. 85, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 26,370 (1980), reprinted in 1 SUPERFUND, supra note 4, at 31.
27. For an example of a court employing similar reasoning see supra note 136 and accompanying text.
28. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 435, 461-62
(1984). See also infra note 40, explaining the difference in alienability between different types of
easements.
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subject to the easement, the easement holder should be regarded as an
owner under CERCLA.
An additional component of CERCLA's legislative history, the
policies underlying the drafters' imposition of liability on current owners, also indicates that in some situations liability should be extended
to easement holders. CERCLA reflects congressional intent to have
private parties rather than the government finance the cleanup. 29
Although Congress sought to have responsible parties bear the cleanup costs, 30 it used membership in particular groups as a proxy for responsibility, and imposed strict liability on persons falling within certain categories. 31 Strict liability facilitates enforcement of the statute
by eliminating the difficult task of proving negligence. 32 The inherently dangerous nature of hazardous waste disposal justifies this approach;33 those who engage in this type of business assume
responsibility for the harm they might cause.
Landowners who merely purchase contaminated property without
intentionally participating in the hazardous waste disposal process
have been held liable under CERCLA. 34 Perhaps the difficulties of
imposing liability on actual waste generators, disposers or other more
directly responsible parties motivated the drafters of CERCLA to include these purchasers within the liability scheme. 35 An additional,
influential factor could have been that landowners benefited from the
29. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1979), reprinted in 2 SUPERFUND, supra note 4,
at 525; Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste
Cleanup, 38 HAsTINGs L.J. 1261, 1290-91 (1987).
30. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
31. Although CERCLA does not expressly provide for strict liability, in§ 101(10), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(10) (1988), it incorporates the standards of the Clean Water Act, which courts have construed as imposing strict liability. Hence, CERCLA has been interpreted as imposing strict liability. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Ward,
618 F. Supp. 884, 893 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
32. 126 CoNG. REc. 26,762 (1980), reprinted in I SUPERFUND, supra note 4, at 215 (Na·
tional Association of Attorneys General Memorandum, submitted in support for adopting strict
liability as the standard for H.R. 7020).
33. 126 CoNG. REc. 26,783 (1980) (statement of Rep. Gore discussing strict liability in the
context of urging adoption of an amendment to H.R. 7020 limiting the third party defense),
reprinted in I SUPERFUND, supra note 4, at 218-19. As indicated by Rep. Gore's statements,
strict liability is the general tort law standard for inherently dangerous activities. See REsTATE·
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 519 (1965) (calling for strict liability for those engaging in abnormally hazardous activities).
34. See, e.g., Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572
(5th Cit. 1988) (The Court imposed liability on lenders, realtors, and others developing a subdivision found to contain hazardous waste. These people did not contribute to the hazardous waste
accumulation.); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043-45 (2d Cir. 1985) (purchaser who knew of toxic waste accumulation, though he had not participated in its generation,
found liable).
35. Although the legislative history is inconclusive on this matter, several commentators
have suggested this as possible congressional motivation. See Note, supra note 29, at 1291; Note,
Developments - Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1458, 1520 (1986).
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hazardous waste accumulation in the form of reduced property
costs. 36 Exempting current owners from liability would encourage the
sale of waste sites after the conclusion of dumping, since new owners
would be protected from CERCLA liability. 37 These owners might
then receive a windfall if they enjoyed the increased value of the property after cleanup without contributing to its costs. 38 Because easement holders share many attributes with owners of a fee simple
estate, 39 the same logic would dictate finding them liable as well. 40
Moreover, some easement holders may have deeper pockets than
the fee simple owner and therefore would be a more attractive target.
In the event of "indivisible harm," 41 CERCLA has been interpreted as
permitting the imposition of joint and several liability on responsible
parties.42 In addition to resolving the difficulty of apportioning essentially indivisible claims and proving the liability of multiple defendants, 43 the other obvious benefit of this type of liability is that the
government can recover the costs of cleanup fully even if several po36. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Of course sometimes the purchaser does not
receive a benefit. If the seller did not know about the waste, she would not discount the price of
the land.
37. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985).
38. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986)
(suggesting that lenders who foreclosed on property would greatly benefit from its increased postcleanup value if they did not contribute financially to the cleanup). However, if the property is
sold with neither party having knowledge of the hazardous waste then the cleanup will increase
the value only to what the purchaser paid. See Note, supra note 29, at 1291 n.161.
39. See infra notes 53 & 55 and accompanying text.
40. Although easement holders could gain from the cheap acquisition of easements, some
probably would not reap as great a benefit as the fee simple owner from the prcperty's increased,
post-cleanup value. Appurtenant easements, easements attached to the dominant estate, are generally sold with the dominant estate, R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 28, at 461, and therefore are
not as readily transferable. On the other hand, easements in gross benefit their owner personally,
and are unrelated to any particular piece of land. Commercial easements in gross are generally
freely alienable. Id.
41. Indivisible harms are harms which "by their very nature, are normally incapable of any
logical, reasonable, or practical division. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 433A, comment
i (1965) (illustrations 12-17).
42. See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984,
994-95 (D.S.C. 1986), ajfd. in part, vacated in part sub nom., United States v. Monsanto Co., 853
F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); United States v. Argent Corp., 14
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,497 (D.N.M. May 4, 1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F.
Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11
(S.D. Ohio 1983). But see United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256-57
(S.D. Ill. 1984).
The A & F Materials court advocated an approach to joint and several liability designed to
prevent a small contributor from shouldering an unreasonably heavy burden. In addition to the
indivisibility of the harm, the approach considered other factors such as the degree of care exercised and the amount of involvement in the hazardous waste disposal process.
For a good discussion of different approaches to joint and several liability and apportionment,
see Note, supra note 35, at 1524-35.
43. See 126 CoNG. REc. 26,783-85 (1980) (statement of Rep. Gore), reprinted in 1
SUPERFUND, supra note 4, at 227-28. Rep. Gore argued for amendments to H.R. 7020 which
would allow imposition of joint and several liability.
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tential defendants are insolvent. Imposing ownership liability on holders of easements increases the chance of finding a solvent "responsible
party" and decreases the amount the government spends.
Because "innocent" easement holders are no less morally culpable
than "innocent" landowners, a joint and several liability scheme which
includes both groups should not be objected to as unfair. Easement
holders may avoid liability through the innocent landowner exception,
if they can prove lack of actual or constructive knowledge of the hazardous waste on their property.44 Additionally, they may sue the
other potentially responsible parties for contribution, and thus avoid
shouldering the entire burden themselves. 45 Since a court hearing a
contribution suit would have discretion to equitably apportion the response costs,46 an easement holder whose easement covers only a small
strip of the hazardous waste site would, assuming the presence of
other responsible and solvent parties, bear only a small percentage of
the response costs.
II.

COMMON LAW LIABILITY OF EASEMENT HOLDERS

CERCLA grew out of general tort ideas, such as products liability
and liability for ultrahazardous activities. 47 In fact, its critics contend
that it duplicates provisions of state toxic tort law. 48 CERCLA, therefore, should be read against the background of the basic definitions of
tort law, except when the Act provides otherwise. In considering easement holder liability under CERCLA, the common law view regarding the status of easement holders compared with owners of the fee
simple estate can aid in the interpretation of the term owner which the
Act inadequately defines. 49 In fact, when a federal district court answered a related problem - whether lessees were liable as owners
under CERCLA-it considered their common law liabilities. 50 This
Part examines the case law dealing with easement holders' responsibilities, as well as the treatment of easement holders under the California
Tort Claims Act and the Restatement of Torts. It demonstrates that,
under both common law and statutory law, easement holders who assert a requisite amount of control over the land constituting the ease44. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
45. CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988).
46. CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988).
47. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980), reprinted in 1 SUPBRFUND, supra note 4,
at 186. This Senate report accompanied S. 1480, one of CERCLA's predecessors.
48. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. I, at 67 (1980), reprinted in 1 SUPBRFUND,
supra note 4, at 232. This House report accompanied H.R. 7020, one of CERCLA's forerunners.
49. See supra note 21 and accompanying text, indicating a lack of a meaningful definition for
"owner'' in CERCLA.
50. See United States v. South Carolina Recycling, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984),
affd. in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 853 F.2d 160 (4th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989). See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
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ment incur liabilities similar to those of the owner of the underlying
fee.
An easement is "a privilege which the owner of one tenement has a
right to enjoy over the tenement of another."s 1 Although a nonpossessory interest, s2 an easement nevertheless vests the holder with significant rights. According to the Restatement of Property an easement:
(a) entitles the owner of such interest to a limited use or enjoyment of
the land in which the interest exists;
(b) entitles him to protection as against third persons from interference
in such use or enjoyment; [and]
(c) is not subject to the will of the possessor of the land ....s3

Common easements include railroad rights-of-way, driveways, paths,
roads, pipes, and utility lines. s4 Although the line sometimes blurs,
the primary difference between an easement holder and the fee simple
owner is that the terms of the easement restrict the farmer's use of the
property, while the latter can enjoy full use of the property.ss The
large number of cases in which an easement holder is compensated for
the taking of an easement reflects the importance given this property
interest. s6
A.

Common Law Duties of Easement Holders

Duties accompany the rights accorded easement holders, and failure to perform these duties can result in liability. An examination of
the liability in tort of easement holders as compared with the liability
of the owners of the fee simple estate provides useful analogies for
CERCLA liability and supports the extension of owner liability to
easement holders in some instances.
Easement holders must maintain and repair the land subject to the
easement, or face liability if failure to do so results in injury to third
parties. s1 For example, in Kesslering v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway
Co., ss the plaintiff's decedent crashed into a grade separation structure
on which the tracks of a railway crossed the highway.s 9 The railroad
51. Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 520, 365 P.2d 952, 955 (1961); Young v. Thendara,
Inc., 328 Mich. 42, 51, 43 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1950); 25 AM. JuR. 2o Easements § 1 (1964).
52. Leichter v. Eastern Realty Co., 358 Pa. Super. 189, 197, 516 A.2d 1247, 1251 (1986)
(concurring opinion) (quoting the REsrATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 comment b (1944)).
53. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944).
54. R. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 28, at 435.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Robertson v. State Highway Commn., 148 Mont. 275, 420 P.2d 21 (1966); In re
Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 232, 190 N.E.2d 65 (Ct. of
C.P. 1963).
51. See, e.g., Kesslering v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 437 F. Supp. 267, 269 (E.D. Mich.
1977); Levy v. Kimball, 50 Haw. 497, 498, 443 P.2d 142, 144 (1968); Mscisz v. Russell, 338 Pa.
Super. 38, 40, 487 A.2d 839, 840 (1984).
58. Kess/ering, 431 F. Supp. at 267.
59. Kesslering, 431 F. Supp. at 268.
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had granted the state an easement to build the highway across the
tracks. 60 The plaintiff contended that the accident resulted from poor
maintenance and construction of the structure crossing the railroad. 61
Applying and affirming the general common law rule, a federal district
court in Michigan held that the easement holder, rather than the
owner of the servient estate, had the duty to repair. 62
The cases imposing a duty to repair on the easement holder generally describe this responsibility as repairing or maintaining the structure or path used for access across the servient estate. 63 When an
easement is for a pipeline or another analogous underground structure, the easement holder must install and maintain the pipe so that
those making ordinary use of the surface above the pipe do not cause
dangerous breaks or leaks of the pipe. 64 The duty to repair sometimes
requires construction of additional features to allow for safe use of the
easement. 65
The courts' focus on the easement holder's obligation to maintain
safe conditions on the land constituting the easement presents useful
analogies for easement holders' duties under CERCLA. Hazardous
wastes present on the land subject to the easement, just like obstructions on the surface, or leaking pipes below, eventually might render
use of the easement unsafe. On the other hand, unless the easement
holder is producing or using the hazardous waste, the responsibility
for keeping the land subject to the easement free from these hazards is
more attenuated than in the above examples. Often the harm from the
hazardous waste results from seepage into ground water, rather than
any effect on users of the easement itself. Whether the duty to repair
extends to keeping land free of hazardous waste therefore is unclear.
By imposing the duty to repair on easement holders, however, courts
have treated easement holders as having the responsibilities of owners.
Such treatment supports the contention that easement holders should
be liable as owners under CERCLA.
B.

The Significance of Control

An examination of easement holder liability cases provides further
insight into the common law responsibilities of easement holders, and
60. Kesslering, 437 F. Supp. at 268.
61. Kesslering, 437 F. Supp. at 268.
62. Kesslering, 437 F. Supp. at 269.
63. See, e.g., Kesslering, 437 F. Supp. at 269 (Easement holder would have a duty to repair
the grade separation structure which was part of the easement across the highway.); Fry v. Kaiser, 60 Mich. App. 574, 232 N.W.2d 673 (1975) (Easement holder for use of a channel must
maintain channel and abutting sea walls.); Mscisz v. Russell, 338 Pa. Super. 38, 487 A.2d 839
(1984) (regarding the duty to repair a driveway with multiple easement holders).
64. Pioneer Natural Gas Co. v. K & M Paving Co., 374 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tex. 1963).
65. See Levy v. Kimball, 50 Haw. 497, 500, 443 P.2d 142, 145 (1968) (requiring construction
of handrails and posting of signs).
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suggests an analogous approach to their duties under CERCLA. In
each of the cases discussed below, the easement holder's degree of control over the land subject to the easement played a critical role in the
court's decision. The first group of cases rely on the Restatement of
Torts, which defines possession in terms of occupation and intent to
control. 66 Because it attempts to describe the state of the common
law, the Restatement itself and cases interpreting it demonstrate that
the common law conception of ownership contains a control criterion.
This section argues that CERCLA's definition of owner should be similarly construed.
A Maryland Court of Appeals decision, Wagner v. Doehring, 67
based the limited liability it accorded an easement holder on the tort
law conception of possession contained in the Restatement. 68 The defendants in this case owned an easement which provided access to
their estate. 6 9 A motorcyclist trespassing on the property died when
his motorcycle crashed into a chain the defendants placed across the
right-of-way. 70 The court held that unless the easement holder's conduct was "wanton or willful" they were not liable for the death. 71
The Wagner court considered whether an easement holder, like a
landowner, only had a limited duty toward the trespasser. The court
noted that although property law regards an easement as a nonpossessory interest, tort law, which governs liability in this case, defines possessor differently. 72 The court relied on the tort law definition of
possessor contained in the Restatement, and applied occupation and
intent to control as criteria for possession. 73 It determined that by
using and exercising dominion over the right-of-way the defendant occupied and possessed the land. 74
With regard to the degree of control necessary for a decreased duty
toward trespassers, the Maryland court asserted, "[T]he holder of an
easement for ingress and egress is afforded the same protection to
which a landowner is entitled with respect to a trespasser, when the
easement holder exercises a degree of control over the land which per66. See infra note 68.
67. 315 Md. 97, 102, 104, 553 A.2d 684, 688 (1989).
68. "Section 328E of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) defines a possessor ofland as
(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it or (b) a person who has
been in occupation ofland with intent to control it, if no other person has subsequently occupied
it with intent to control it, or (c) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if
no other person is in possession under Clauses (a) and (b)." Wagner, 315 Md. at 104-05, 553
A.2d at 686-87.
69. Wagner, 315 Md. at 99, 553 A.2d at 685.
70. Wagner, 315 Md. at 100, 553 A.2d at 685-86.
71. Wagner, 315 Md. at 108, 553 A.2d at 689.
72. Wagner, 315 Md. at 103, 553 A.2d at 687.
73. See Wagner, 315 Md. at 104-05, 553 A.2d at 688.
74. Wagner, 315 Md. at 105, 553 A.2d at 688.
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mits the holder to exclude trespassers from the easement." 75 The
court in deciding the question of control noted that because the servient estate in Wagner was uninhabited, and the owner of the land did
not permit anyone to use it, the easement holders could reasonably
expect to bar trespassers. 76 In effect, the court tailored the tort law
control standard for possession to the specific legal problem of an easement holder's duty to trespassers. This approach suggests that control
criteria, consistent with the goals of CERCLA, should be formulated
for determining easement holders' liability as owners under the Act.
In Leichter v. Eastern Realty Co., 77 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court also applied the Restatement of Torts definition and analyzed
control to evaluate the duties of an easement holder to a business invitee. In Leichter, the plaintiff's decedent suffered a heart attack after
his abduction from an allegedly improperly lit parking lot. 78 Acme
. Markets, one of the defendants in this case, held an easement and a
parking privilege on the land constituting the parking lot. 79 The plaintiff argued that an easement holder should be considered a "possessor
ofland," and that consequently, under the Restatement of Torts, Acme
had a duty to "protect business invitees from the criminal behavior of
people coming onto the land." 80 In evaluating the plaintiff's contention, the Leichter court noted that the definition of possessor in the
Restatement focuses on control and occupation rather than on legal
title. 81 The court concluded that if the easement holder - in this instance, Acme - exerted sufficient control over the land, it should be
considered a "possessor."82
Although not explicitly relying on the Restatement, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Green v. Duke Power Co., 83 also used control
over the property as the standard for easement holder responsibility.
In this case, the power company owned an easement on which it maintained a transformer. A five-year-old girl was injured by touching the
transformer which, the plaintiff claimed, the power company negligently left unlocked. 84 Since Duke Power was the sole owner of the
15. Wagner, 315 Md. at 107, 553 A.2d at 689.
76. Wagner, 315 Md. at 107-08, 553 A.2d at 689.
77. 358 Pa. Super. 189, 516 A.2d 1247 (1986).
78. Leichter, 358 Pa. Super. at 190-91, 516 A.2d at 1248.
79. To be precise, ACME held an "easement for ingress and egress with a privilege to park."
Leichter, 358 Pa. Super. at 191, 516 A.2d at 1248-49.
80. § 344 of the Restatement of Torts places this duty to business invitees on "possessors" of
land. Leichter, 358 Pa. Super. at 192-93, 516 A.2d at 1249; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS
§ 344 (1965).
81. See Leichter, 358 Pa. Super. at 192 n.1, 516 A.2d at 1249 n.1 (quoting REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OP TORTS § 328E (1965) (definition of possessor of land)).
82. Leichter, 358 Pa. Super. at 195, 516 A.2d at 1250.
83. 305 N.C. 603, 290 S.E.2d 593 (1982).
84. Green, 305 N.C. at 604, 290 S.E.2d at 594.
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transformer, and had the right to operate it and to enter the premises
at will, the court found that the fee simple owner could do no more
than warn, since more drastic action would infringe upon Duke
Power's rights. 85 Therefore, the owner satisfied his duty by cautioning
the girl. 86 The Green court asserted that because it exercised greater
control, Duke Power - the easement holder - had the sole duty to
protect children from the dangers of the transformer. 87
Green supports the argument that if the easement holder, rather
than the owner of the fee simple estate, were able to prevent or detect a
hazardous waste problem, then she should be held liable as an owner
under CERCLA. The Green court focused on which party could better have eliminated the danger, and deemphasized the parties' nominal
status as easement holder and owner. An analogous approach to
CERCLA cases would encourage courts to consider an easement
holder's dominion over the property, and evaluate her ability to monitor for hazardous waste dangers. In contrast with the tort liability
considered in Green, CERCLA liability is not an either/or question in
which the court must decide whether to hold an easement holder liable
instead of the owner. Because the owner of the fee simple meets the
criteria for ownership under CERCLA, if the easement holder is
found liable, both parties, along with any generators, transporters or
former owners or operators, may be jointly and severally liable. s's
Under the California Tort Claims Act, as well as under the common law, easement holders have been held liable in tort to the same
extent as fee simple owners. Although California courts' interpretations of the term "owner" contained in a state statute do not constitute
precedent for CERCLA interpretation, they do indicate that a construction of the term which includes easement holders is logical in
some circumstances. As in the Restatement, the Act includes the idea
of control within its definitions. 89 Again, because this control criterion
reflects the common law, 90 rather than adds to it, the courts' interpre85. Green, 305 N.C. at 611, 290 S.E.2d at 598.
86. Green, 305 N.C. at 613, 290 S.E.2d at 599.
87. Green, 305 N.C. at 612, 290 S.E.2d at 598-99; accord Reyna v. Ayco Dev. Corp, 788
S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (In an opinion following Green, the court uses similar reasoning
with respect to a nearly identical fact pattern.); Gnau v. Union Blee. Co., 672 S.W.2d 142 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984) (same).
In Cooper v. City of Reading, 392 Pa. 452, 140 A.2d 792 (1958), the court employed similar
reasoning. In this case the defendant owned an easement permitting it to discharge water into a
canal. Two children died while playing on the frozen pool created by the water. The court
concluded that the easement holder so completely controlled the land around the resulting pool
as to be liable as a possessor under § 339 of the Restatement of Torts, which incorporates the
attractive nuisance doctrine.
88. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
90. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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tation of the relationship between control and ownership aids in understanding CERCLA's definition of owner.
California courts have emphasized the issue of control in interpreting the applicability of the California Tort Claims Act to public entities holding easements.9 1 The California Tort Claims Act imposes
liability for the failure of public bodies to protect others against dangerous conditions on their property. 92 The Act defines public property
as "property owned or controlled by the public entity." 93 The California courts have evaluated the relative importance of ownership and
control in determining which public entity should bear responsibility
under the Act when an easement holder and owner both have property
rights in the land.94
For example, in Low v. City ofSacramento, 95 an accident occurred
on a parking strip. The city held an easement across the strip, and the
county owned the underlying fee. The Low court turned to the common law for assistance in interpreting the California Tort.Claims Act.
The court relied on the common law principle that "control dominates
over title." 96 In determining which party had the control necessary
for liability, the court considered which party could have prevented
the problem which led to the accident or rectified the danger once it
arose.9 7 The court held that in this instance both the county and the
city had sufficient control and thus both properly were held liable.98
The Low court's analysis provides a useful framework for evaluating the situation under CERCLA in which both an easement holder
and a fee simple owner retain some control over a contaminated area.
An easement holder who could have prevented the hazardous waste
build-up, or who could have discovered it and cleaned it up, should
incur liability jointly with the fee simple owner.
In Mamo la v. County of San Bernardino, 99 another case arising
under the Torts Claim Act, the court analyzed the problem of liability
similarly and cited Low with approval, although it reached a different
91. See Tolan v. State, 100 Cal. App. 3d 980, 161 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1979); Mamola v. County
of San Bernardino, 94 Cal. App. 3d 781, 156 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1979); Low v. City of Sacramento, 7
Cal. App. 3d 826, 87 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970).
92. Cal. [Govt.] Code§ 835 (West 1980), quoted in Mamo/a, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 787 n.1, 156
Cal. Rptr. at 618 n.2.
93. Cal. [Govt.] Code § 830(c) (West 1980), quoted in Mamo/a, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 787 n.3,
156 Cal. Rptr. at 618 n.3.
94. According to one court, the problem arises "when ownership is separated from control;
when the aggregation of powers called ownership is divided and when various kinds of control
are held in separate hands." Low v. City of Sacramento, 7 Cal. App. 3d 826, 831, 87 Cal. Rptr.
173, 175 (1970).
95. 7 Cal. App. 3d 826, 87 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970).
96. Low, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 831, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
97. Low, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 833-34, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
98. Low, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 834, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78.
99. 94 Cal. App. 3d 781, 156 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1979).
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conclusion based on the different facts involved. An accident occurred
on a road owned in fee by a public entity, and subject to an easement
of another public entity. The Mamo/a court upheld a conditional order granting an easement holder summary judgment on the issue of
liability, because its use of the road was limited to ingress and egress,
and it lacked "authority to control or maintain" the road. 100
Although most courts analyze the degree of control asserted by the
easement holder to determine liability as an owner or possessor, at
least one court implicitly assumed that an easement holder is an
owner. In Citizen's Utility, Inc. v. Livingston, 101 an Arizona appellate
court treated the easement holder as an owner and concentrated on
determining the duties of an owner toward a licensee. In this case, the
wife of an electric company employee brought suit for wrongful death
against another electric company which owned the easement on which
her husband was working when he was electrocuted.
In its analysis of the easement holder's liability, the Arizona court
did not question whether the easement holder's duties would necessarily be the same as any other landowner's. 102 The court regarded the
easement holder as an owner for the purpose of tort liability. Citizen's
Utility, by assuming easement holders to be owners for liability purposes, supports the argument for extending CERCLA's ownership liability to easement holders.
In sum, easement holders are often found, under both common law
and statutory law, to have the same duties and liabilities as owners of
the fee simple estate. Most courts, in determining liability, focus on
the degree of control the holder maintains over the easement. The
amount of control often depends upon nature of the easement and the
extent of authority granted to the easement holder. 103 Though two
easements might seem the same superficially, the underlying understanding between the easement holder and the owner of the underlying
100. Mamo/a, 94 Cal. App. 3d. at 789, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
101. 21 Ariz. App. 48, 515 P.2d 345 (1973).
102. The appellee took the position that the electric company's liability arose from its status
as "the owner of the premises, the easement where the accident occurred." Citizen's Utility, 21
Ariz. App. at 51, 515 P.2d at 348. The court did not specifically reach the question but treated
the utility as an owner for purposes of the opinion.
103. For example, the Mamo/a court noted the limitation of the easement reserved, namely
the lack of authority to maintain or control the road, and consequently found the easement
holder's liabilities to be correspondingly restricted. Mamola v. County of San Bernardino, 94
Cal. App. 3d 781, 789, 156 Cal. Rptr. 614, 619 (1979). In contrast, the terms of the easement in
Green v. Duke Power Co., transferred a broader right "to construct, maintain and operate
. [thereon] ... transformers ... together with the right at all times to enter said premises ...."
Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 611, 290 S.E.2d 593, 598 (1982). The easement holder
was therefore found to have greater liabilities. Similarly, in Cooper v. City of Reading, the easement holder was found "within the purpose of its easement [to possess] some control over the
place of discharge, in order to safeguard and repair it for the purposes of efficiency and safety."
392 Pa. 452, 461-62, 140 A.2d 792, 796 (1958). The easement holder was held to have related
liabilities.
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fee, as well as the type of use made of the easement, influences the
court's decisions. 104 The extension of this approach to CERCLA supports the liability of easement holders whose control over the property
passes a certain threshold.
III.

ANALOGIES TO

OTHER

CERCLA CASES

To date, no cases have directly addressed the question of whether
easement holders might be found liable as owners under CERCLA
section 107. 105 Courts, however, have extended ownership liability to
some lessees, lenders, parent corporations, corporate officers and stock
holders. 106 Before examining these decisions, this Part clarifies the
Note's scope and discusses the problems with using some of the ownership liability cases as analogies to easement holder liability. This
Part then examines these cases in detail and concludes that the courts'
logic supports ownership liability for easement holders who exercise
sufficient control over the easement.
This Note limits its treatment to the liability of easement holders
as owners under CERCLA. The question of easement holders' liability
as operators does not present many problems, since there is nothing
about entities holding easements which would differentiate them from
any other operators. An easement holder who operates a pipeline, for
example, is considered an operator of a facility under CERCLA.1°7
Therefore, if the pipe leaked hazardous chemicals into the surrounding
area the easement holder would be liable as an operator.
The question of liability becomes more difficult when the easement
holder did not contribute to the hazardous waste problem, and a leaking, hazardous waste site is discovered on the land subject to the easement. Since the easement holder probably cannot be considered an
operator of the land containing the waste, the issue becomes whether
the easement holder should be considered the "owner" of the land for
CERCLA purposes.
CERCLA's legislative history demonstrates that one need not be
both an owner and operator to be found liable under CERCLA. 108
104. See Leichter v. Eastern Realty Co., 358 Pa. Super. 189, 197, 516 A.2d 1247, 1252 (1986)
(Kelly, J., concurring).
105. CERCLA §§ 107(a)(1) and (2) are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), (2) (1988). See
supra note 6 for relevant text. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., suit was brought against the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, an easement holder, charging that it should be liable as an
owner or operator under CERCLA for the pollution caused by tar deposits on the easement. 491
U.S. 1 (1989). However, since the question before the Court was whether a state could be found
liable for CERCLA cleanup costs, the issue of the liability of easement owners was not reached.
Because the Court decided affirmatively, a lower court on remand will be left to determine
whether easement holders can be liable as owners.
106. See infra notes 115-58 and accompanying text.
107. CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988) (specifically defining facility to include
pipes).
108. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 1986)
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H.R. 85 (The Comprehensive Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Liability and Compensation Act), a precursor of CERCLA, defined an
operator in terms of a relationship with the owner, indicating the distinctness of these positions. The Committee Report on H.R. 85 stated:
"In the case of a facility, an 'operator' is defined to be a person who is
carrying out operational functions for the owner of the facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement." 109 This definition suggests the inconsistency of reading CERCLA ..as requiring both ownership and
operation to incur liability, 110 and illustrates one way to differentiate
between an owner and an operator.
Perhaps because CERCLA defines the terms "owner" and "operator" together, 111 many courts seem to disregard the distinction between these two categories, often holding a defendant liable as an
"owner and operator." 112 Because courts apply similar reasoning to
problems of both ownership and operation, however, even cases emphasizing operator liability aid in the interpretation of easement holders' ownership liability under CERCLA.
The degree of control exercised often dictates the outcome in
CERCLA owner and operator cases. H.R. 85's definition of operator
suggests that analysis of the control over the management of the company determines whether the person (or company) should be considered an operator. 113 Sufficient involvement in the affairs of the facility,
without any trappings of ownership, could lead to classification as an
operator. Similarly, CERCLA's definition of "owner or operator" ex(interpreting CERCLA's legislative history to mean that one need not be both an owner and
operator to be liable under CERCLA).
109. H.R. Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 3,
at 6119, 6182.
110. See Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 578 ("By its very definition, an operator cannot be
the same person as an owner.").
111. See CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) ("The term 'owner or operator' means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise,
such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or
operating such facility ••..").
112. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 849
(W.D. Mo. 1984), modified, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987)
("The Court finds that the evidence presented is sufficient to impose liability on Lee as an 'owner
and operator.").
The ambiguous language of CERCLA § 107 also contributes to the confusion surrounding
the liabilities of owners and operators. The section imposes liability on "the owner and operator
of a vessel or a facility" as well as on "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed
of •..." CERCLA §§ 107(a)(l), (2), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(l), (2) (1988) (emphasis added).
Because the first provision uses "and" in contrast with the use of "or" in the second provision,
and because it refers to "the owner and operator'' rather than "the owner and the operator," the
section could be read as requiring both ownership and operation of a facility in order to incur
liability. Courts, however, have discounted this interpretation.
113. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) ("LeoGrande
is in charge of the operation of the facility in question, and as such is an 'operator' within the
meaning of CERCLA.").
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eludes one holding merely "indicia of ownership" from classification
as either an owner or operator unless that person participates in the
management of the facility. 114 Thus, the question of control speaks to
ownership as well. Someone with a property interest in the facility
who also has sufficient control over the operation of the facility could
be classified as an owner. These methods of classification could explain the blurring of the analysis in many of the cases, since the defendants usually had some property interest, often in the form of stock
ownership, and also often managed the relevant company. The degree
of control exercised would then, support classification both as an
owner and operator. Although the courts rarely indicate which parts
of their analysis pertain to liability of owners and which to operators,
this Note will attempt to focus on the aspects of the reasoning relating
to ownership.
A. Lessee Liability
A decision regarding the CERCLA liability of a lessee presents the
closest analogy to the easement question. Lessees, like easement holders, and unlike shareholders, parent corporations and lenders, directly
exert control over the contaminated property. In United States v.
South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 115 a South Carolina federal district court held a lessee liable as an owner under CERCLA.
The defendant corporation leased a site for the purpose of storing
chemicals. Later it sublet a portion of this property to another company involved in the waste disposal business. In determining that the
original lessee was liable, the court focused on the degree of control
the lessee exercised over the property. The court regarded control as a
qualification for ownership under CERCLA, 116 and viewed the company's sublet of the premises as an illustration of control over the
property. As further justification for imposing liability, the court relied on common law decisions holding lessees liable as owners in other
contexts. 117
Both of the court's arguments in South Carolina Recycling support
extension of liability to easement holders. First, easement holders, like
lessees, have been found liable as owners in other common law situa114. "The term 'owner or operator' ..• does not include a person, who, without participating
in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
security interest in the vessel or facility." CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)
(1988).
115. 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984), ajfd. in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v.
Monsanto Co., 853 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
116. 653 F. Supp. at 1003.
117. 653 F. Supp. at 1003 n.2. For example, the South Carolina Recycling court notes that
under the state constitution tenants have been found entitled to compensation as owners, and the
term owner in condemnation statutes has been construed to include lessees.
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tions. 118 Additionally, in holding the lessee liable the court implicitly
acknowledged that a person with less than a complete bundle of property rights could still be regarded as an owner. 119 In comparison with
a lessee, an easement holder possesses a similar number of sticks of
ownership. A lessee's interest in the property resembles that of the
owner of a fee simple, but is limited temporally. 120 In contrast, the
easement holder's interest can extend indefinitely in time, but is restricted in permitted uses. 121 Although lessees generally exercise
greater control over the property than easement holders do, an easement could be granted which allowed for extensive use and controI. 12 2
The South Carolina Recycling decision suggests that, if this control
were exercised, the easement holder would be regarded as an owner
for the purpose of CERCLA liability. 123
In United States v. Caro/awn Co., 124 the district court in South Carolina again found owner liability possible despite the absence of
title to the property. 125 As in the lessee case, the court emphasized the
link between control and liability. In this dispute one defendant, Columbia Organic Chemical Company (COCC), received title to contaminated property, and within an hour transferred this title to several
individuals. 126 In denying COCC's motion for summary judgment on
the issue of its ownership liability, the court stated that the company,
although relinquishing title, might have maintained "sufficient control
over the site to qualify as an owner." 127 The court held that further
investigation would be necessary before a decision could be made on
the question. 128
·
118. See supra Part II.
119. The modem conception of property ownership does not characterize ownership as an
indivisible right in the property, but rather describes it as consisting of a bundle of distinct rights
(often referred to as sticks), such as the ability to use, sell, devise, and exclude. Thus more than
one person can "own" the same property if different people possess different sticks of ownership.
See Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in c. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER & P. MARTIN, PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CoNCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 163, 163-64 (2d ed. 1983).
120. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 429, 462 P.2d 470, 472 (1969).
121. See REsrATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944).
122. For an example of such an easement, see supra notes 83-87 an!l accompanying text.
123. In South Carolina Recycling. however, the lessee was also held liable as an operator,
generator, and transporter, and this might have influenced the court's decision to find it liable as
an owner. United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 100306 (D.S.C. 1984), affd. in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d
160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989). Although the court examined each issue
separately and seemed to reach each conclusion independently, the other findings of liability
might have reduced the significance of ownership liability and allowed the court to find liability
on that ground more easily.
124. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698 (D.S.C. June 15, 1984).
125. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,698. The court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that lack of title does not necessarily preclude liability.
·
126. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,698.
127. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,698.
128. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,699.
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In both of these cases the courts clearly indicated that control,
rather than title, determines ownership under CERCLA. Thus,
although easement holders lack title to the land, if they exert dominion over the property, under the South Carolina court's reasoning,
they should be liable as owners under CERCLA.
B.

Lender Liability

The extension of owner liability to lenders also suggests that easement holders should be held liable under CERCLA. This argument is
particularly compelling given that lenders resemble traditional owners
even less than do easement holders. Lender liability under CERCLA
divides into two subissues: whether a lender who forecloses on property and thus takes title to the land should face liability as an owner,
and whether, even without foreclosure, a lender could in some instances be held liable as an owner. 129 United States v. Mirabile, 130 a
federal district court decision, suggests that in some instances the answer to both questions would be yes, even though the court did not
bifurcate its analysis in this manner.
The Mirabile court examined the liability of several lenders who
had made secured loans to owners of a hazardous waste site. One of
these lenders foreclosed on the property. The court considered
whether any of the creditors could be considered "owners" as defined
in CERCLA, 131 or whether they merely held a security interest in the
property. 132 The court concluded that the security interest exclusion
within CERCLA's definition of owner shielded creditors from liability
in the absence of a sufficient degree of participation in the day-to-day
management of the relevant company. 133 Based on this reasoning the
court granted summary judgment in favor of two of the defendants,
including the one that had foreclosed on the property. With respect to
the defendant that foreclosed, the court found its lack of participation
in the operations of the company far more significant than its possible
acquisition of title. 134 Thus, according to this court, title in the absence of control could not lead to liability.
The third defendant in Mirabile presented the opposite problem 129. See Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
130. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
131. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
132. Mirabile. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
133. Mirabile. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995; accord United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp.
1193, 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1989). The Mirabile court was careful to distinguish between control of
financial matters, which would not lead to liability, and control over the actual business itself
which could result in liability. For example, the court attached significance to participation in
"operational, production or waste disposal activities" as opposed to the "financial ability to control waste disposal practices." 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995-96.
134. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996. The defendant had foreclosed on the property but
shortly thereafter transferred its successful bid from the sheriff's sale to another party.
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control without title. Representatives of the defendant banks's predecessor participated in the management of the facility without receiving
title to the property. With respect to this defendant, the court denied
summary judgment, holding that whether the bank had sufficiently
participated in the day-to-day operations to incur liability remained to
be determined. 135 The court's reasoning implies that CERCLA's definition of owner, with its accompanying security interest exemption,
acts not only as a shield, but also as a sword. In suggesting the potential liability of this defendant the court seems to reason from the converse of CERCLA's security interest exemption from the ownership
definition, 136 interpreting it to mean that some threshold participation
in the operations of a company liable under CERCLA, plus some indicia of ownership, can support liability. In fact, by hintmg at the possible liability of this lender, who had neither title nor any other obvious
trappings of ownership, except a security interest, the couit implies
that the "indicia of ownership" requirement is minimal. 137
In United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 138 the Eleventh Circuit lowered the control threshold for lender liability set by the Mirabile court.
The Fleet Factors court rejected the Mirabile criterion of participation
in the day-to-day management of the facility. Instead, the Eleventh
Circuit asserted that "financial management of a facility to a degree
indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes" is sufficient for liability. 139
Although the control of the various lenders analyzed in Mirabile
and Fleet Factors differs from that of an easement holder because the
lenders influence the corporation rather than the land itself, this difference actually further justifies liability for easement holders. CERCLA
suggests that control over the facility should determine liability.140
The lender indirectly exerts control over the facility by exercising influence over the corporation. 141 The easement holder, on the other
135. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,997.
136. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). See supra note 114.
137. Since the court was ruling on the defendants' motions for summary judgment, it merely
had to reach the question of whether the defendants were not liable as a matter of law, or
whether there was still a controversy in this area. Although the ruling may have significant
implications for other nontraditional "owners" such as easement holders, the court's implicit
reasoning as well as its statement of the lender's potential, albeit unlikely, liability is best regarded as dicta.
138. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
139. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. The Ninth Circuit, the only other appellate court to
address the issue of lender liability, declined to establish a rule for determining the degree of
control necessary for liability. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1990).
140. ''The term 'owner or operator' ... does not include a person, who, without participating
in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
security interest in the vessel or facility." CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)
(1988) (emphasis added).
141. But see Mirabile, 15 ENVTL. L. REPTR. at 20995 ("The reference to management of the
'facility,' as opposed to management of the affairs of the actual owner or operator of the facility,
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hand, exerts control directly over the facility 142 by asserting dominion
over the land constituting the easement.143
'
Another seminal lender liability case, United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co., 144 rejected the control approach in its exan1ination
of the question of ownership after foreclosure. In this case, a federal
district court held liable as an owner a mortgagee who foreclosed on
property containing hazardous waste, purchased the property at a
foreclosure sale, and retained title for four years. 145 The court disagreed with the Mirabile court's view that a company must participate
in the management of the site after foreclosure in order to incur liability.146 The Maryland Bank court, in rejecting the control approach,
emphasized that Congress designed the security exemption to apply to
those possessing "merely indicia of ownership" at the time of cleanup
rather than to those who foreclosed on their security interest prior to
the cleanup and gained title to the property. 147
The Maryland Bank court feared that, if banks were relieved from
liability, the federal government rather than the banks would assume
the risk of taking security interests in contaminated property. The
court wanted to prevent CERCLA from becoming "an insurance
scheme for financial institutions, protecting them against possible
losses due to the security of loans with polluted properties."148
Although foreclosure and purchase technically results in ownership, lenders usually take these steps because there is no other way to
protect the security interest. In this respect the lender differs from the
suggests once again that the participation which is critical is participation in operational, production, or waste disposal activities.").
142. Assuming the land contains hazardous wastes, the property would meet the definition of
facility. See CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988).
143. In Mirabile, and other cases in this Part, the defendant exercises control over an entity
contributing to the hazardous waste problem. The easement holder, on the other hand, is further
removed from the causal nexus. It must be remembered, however, that fault is not a prerequisite
for liability under CERCLA. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. For example, in the
lender liability context, the Maryland Bank court suggests that a lender acquiring property
through foreclosure who not only did not contribute to the problem, but also was unaware of its
existence, could still be held liable under CERCLA. See United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986).
144. 632 F. Supp. at 573.
145. 632 F. Supp. at 580. The Maryland Bank court expressly refused to follow the decision
in In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 288, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,635, 20,640 (N.D. Ohio
1985). In dictum, the T.P. Long Chemical court stated that a lender foreclosing on property in
which it had a security interest, would not incur liability because of the exclusion in CERCLA
§ 101(20)(A) for those holding mere indicia of ownership. Maryland Bank did not need to reach
the question addressed by Mirabile, namely whether a mortgagee who foreclosed and immediately resold the property is an owner. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 579 n.5.
146. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 580.
147. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 579; accord Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg.
Co., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556, 563 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
148. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 580. If the federal government funded the cleanup the
bank would not suffer any losses from its poor judgment. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 580.
The Guidice court cited Maryland Bank's reasoning with approval. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 563.
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typical owner who buys the property for personal use~ or for an investment. The willingness of the courts to expand liability to include these
"involuntary" owners indicates an intent to broaden CERCLA's
reach.
C.

Liability of Parent Corporations, Corporate Officers, and
Stockholders

Two other related lines of cases also support a broad reading of
CERCLA which would classify some easement holders as owners.
Generally the corporate structure protects shareholders, including
parent corporations, from the liabilities of the corporation as a
whole. 149 By focusing on the issue of control, however, courts have
sometimes held parent corporations liable under CERCLA. 150 In addition, major stockholders, who were often also corporate officers,
have been held personally liable as owners or operators Under the
statute. 151
149. R. CLARK, CoRPORATE LAW 7 (1986). Shareholders are only liable for the amount
invested in the corporation. They normally cannot be held personally liable for the actions of the
corporation.
150. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (concurring with
the rule articulated in Bunker Hill, and leaving for a jury the question of whether the criteria for
holding a parent corporation liable has been met); Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831
(D.Vt. 1988) (holding a parent corporation liable as owner and operator); Colorado v. ldarado
Mining Co., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,578 (D. Colo. Apr. 29, 1987) (same); Idaho v.
Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986) (same). But see Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L.
James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that parent corporations cannot be held directly liable as owners under CERCLA).
Both the Idarado court and Bunker Hill court determined that the control exercised by the
respective parent corporation over its subsidiary was sufficient to warrant direct liability as an
owner under CERCLA. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 672; Idarado, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,579.
The courts did not apply the traditional criteria for piercing the corporate veil, such as a disregard for corporate formalities, or use of the corporate structure as a sham.
In Joslyn Manufacturing the Fifth Circuit flatly rejected the trend, illustrated by Idarado and
Bunker Hill, toward broadening the scope of direct liability of owners and operators under CERCLA. Joslyn Manufacturing, 893 F.2d at 82. The court found no evidence in the definition of
owner or in its legislative history to justify what it viewed as a departure from corporate law.
Joslyn Manufacturing, 893 F.2d at 83. The Joslyn court then independently examined whether
the corporate veil should be pierced on the ground of fraud or the use of the corporate entity as a
sham and held to the contrary. Joslyn Manufacturing, 893 F.2d at 83.
According to one court's assessment, the Joslyn court represents the minority view. Most
courts considering the issue have held in favor of direct shareholder and parent liability under
CERCLA. United States v. Allied Chem. Corp, No. C-83-5896-FMS, C-83-5898-FMS (N.D.
Cal. June 27, 1990) (1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11695). Of course, whether liability is imposed in a
particular case depends on its facts.
151. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1985) (major stockholder and officer of company held liable as an operator in an ambiguously worded
opinion, the reasoning of which also supports liability as an owner); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (supplemental memorandum opinion) (president of company and owner of 93% of corporate stock held liable as owner); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 846-850 (1984), ajfd. in part, revd.
in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (The lower court held major individual stockholders who
were also officers personally liable as owners and operators. This opinion formed the foundation
for the other cases finding stockholders or parent companies liable as owners or operators. The
circuit court, without reaching the reasoning of the lower court which gave rise to the liability,
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The quantity of stock owned probably played an important role in
the courts' decisions. Most of the people found individually liable held
controlling quantities of stock in the relevant corporation. 152 Similarly, only parent companies owning large quantities of their subsidiary's stock have been deemed liable as owners in the subsidiary's
facilities. 153 Still, in most instances the party found liable held less
than 100% of the stock; 154 the courts therefore recognized that less
than complete ownership constituted ownership under CERCLA. By
analogy, a less than complete property interest, such as an easement,
should be sufficient if the use granted and control asserted approaches
that of a fee simple owner.
In determining whether parent corporations or corporate officers
and stockholders are owners or operators for purposes of CERCLA
liability, courts have focused on the degree of control a party holds
over the entity responsible for contaminating a site. Two different
courts have employed the same test for determining control. According to them, "'[t]he owner-operator has power to direct the activities
of persons who control the mechanisms causing the pollution. The
owner-operator has the capacity to prevent and abate damage.' " 155
This same test could be applied to easement holders if the pollution
occurred while they held the easement.
The test, however, ignores CERCLA's imposition of liability on
current owners regardless of whether they are responsible for creating
the contamination. Since fixing the problem should require approximately the same degree of control as preventing it, the control criterion also supports a modified test similar to that of the California
Torts Claims Act. The Torts Claims Act's test provides that the
held the individuals not liable as owners or operators because they owned and operated a site
other than the facility in question.).
152. See, e.g., Shore Realty Corp., 159 F.2d at 1037 (suggesting the defendant was the sole
stockholder); Conservation Chem Co., 628 F. Supp. at 187 (The defendant owned at least 93% of
the stock.); Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 519 F. Supp. at 848, 849 (Defendants were major
stockholders.).
153. See /darado, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,578 (In making its decision, the Colorado district
court expressly considered the percentage of subsidiary stock owned by the corporation. The
court determined that 80% ownership during the critical period was sufficient.); Bunker Hill, 635
F. Supp. at 670, 672 (The court found Gulf Oil Co. liable for facilities of Bunker Hill, a wholly
owned subsidiary.).
154. In fact, in United States v. McGraw-Edison Co., 718 F. Supp. 154 (W.D.N.Y. 1989),
the court in denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment, held that issues of material
fact existed as to whether a 49% individual shareholder was liable as an owner or operator under
CERCLA. The shareholder's extent of control over the company, the critical determination,
remained to be evaluated. McGraw-Edison, 718 F. Supp. at 157-58.
155. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 519 F. Supp. at 848-49 (quoting United States v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1972)); Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 672 (same). Both
courts took the test from an Eighth Circuit decision which adopted the Fifth Circuit's construction of the term "owner or operator'' in the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(6) (1988).
Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291, 1293 (8th Cir. 1976).
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owner is the one with the capacity to prevent or remedy damage. 15 6
Often both easement holders and fee simple owners have the power to
clean up the site, and therefore both should be included in the definition of owner.
In implementing a control-based test for stockholders and parent
corporations, the courts examine the degree of control exercised by an
individual or parent over the company which owns the land. 157 As in
lender liability, this inquiry turns on the question of participation in
management of the facility. 158 Again, a similar method of analysis
would support liability for easement holders exercising the requisite
degree of control.
In sum, the courts have broadened CERCLA's reach to encompass
various parties not normally considered owners. The logic of the
courts, particularly the emphasis on control as an indicator of ownership, suggests that some easement holders could be found liable as
well.
IV. A

POLICY APPROACH TO EASEMENT HOLDER LIABILITY

Policy considerations should play an important role in assessing
easement holders responsibility since no case law explicitly addresses
their liability under CERCLA. This Part asserts that easement holders could function as effective monitors of hazardous waste sites. Additionally, easement holder liability would aid in the effective
spreading of risk. Finally, this Part refutes arguments which suggest
that holding easement holders liable would be economically inefficient
or unfair.
A. Monitoring Hazardous Waste Sites
In addition to providing funding for cleanup, CERCLA encourages monitoring of inactive hazardous waste sites. Section 103, for
example, outlines notification requirements regarding hazardous waste
sites and leaks emanating from them. 159 SectiOn 101(35)(A) provides
a further incentive for monitoring these sites by extending an "innocent landowner" exception only to those who "did not know and had
no reason to know that any hazardous substance ... was disposed of
on, in, or at the facility." 160 This provision encourages buyers to investigate prior to purchase and discourages sellers from using unsafe
disposal methods since their use, if discovered, would impede the
156. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., ldarado, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,578; Northeastern Pharmaceutical. 519 F.
Supp. at 847-48.
158. See Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 519 F. Supp. at 848.
159. CERCLA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1988).
160. CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (1988). This provision was included as part of the SARA amendments.
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sale. 161 In some instances, CERCLA may even prompt sellers to undertake the cleanup themselves.162
If courts treated easement holders as owners for the purposes of
CERCLA, the easement holders could also function as effective
monitors. 163 To avoid liability, the buyer of an easement would assess
the potential for hazardous waste leakage prior to the purchase. 164
This assessment increases the number of times the land would be investigated for hazardous waste problems. Otherwise, no environmental audit would be done until the next sale of the servient estate.
Even after the purchase, in the case of an easement across a waste
disposal facility, the easement holder would continue carefully to
monitor the disposal practices of the fee simple owner to avoid potential liability for the owner's improper conduct. Although it is questionable whether easement holders would have the technical ability to
monitor adequately, at least some of the larger companies would have
the necessary in-house expertise. Individuals or smaller companies
would be able to contract for the surveys. In any case, the easement
holders would be more effective than the federal government, which
lacks the resources and organization to monitor efficiently the large
number of hazardous waste facilities across the nation.16s
B. Risk Spreading Analysis

Among factors to be considered in allocating liability, Professors
Prosser and Keeton include the ability to "avoid the loss, or to absorb
it, or to pass it on and distribute it in smaller portions among a larger
group." 166 This theory of risk distribution proposes a wide spreading
of losses over large numbers of people, so that each person is only
161. Note, supra note 29, at 1294. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, RCRA,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1988) regulates hazardous waste disposal from "cradle to grave," 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 3, at 6120 (setting out specific requirements for disposing of this
waste). Often authorities cannot effectively enforce RCRA's provisions, however, and therefore
illegal dumping continues. Note, supra note 35, at 1483. The incentives created by CERCLA's
innocent landowner exception adds another means of encouraging safe disposal. Individuals or
corporations may be held liable under both statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
162. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
163. Cf. Tom, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Participation Under Section
JOJ(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925, 931-35 (1989) (arguing "that lenders are effective
monitors of the environmental health of their debtors").
164. In the case of utilities purchasing easements across large tracts of land, it would prove
impractical to do environmental audits of the entire area. Instead, the company might choose to
self-insure against the risk or negotiate a lower price to guard against the possibility of liability.
Presently, environmental liability insurance is almost unavailable. See infra note 171.
Alternatively, if the interpretation of the innocent landowner exception suggested in Part V is
adopted, the easement holder would only have to survey the areas where a reasonable threat of
hazardous waste releases exists.
165. Cf. Tom, supra note 163, at 933 (describing various reasons why lenders are better able
to monitor hazardous waste sites than the EPA).
166. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEIITON ON TORTS 24 (5th ed. 1984).
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minimally affected. 167 Another theory, the deep pocket approach, argues for placing the loss on those best able to bear it, irrespective of
loss spreading ability. 168 Both approaches minimize "economic dislocations" and therefore increase economic efficiency.1 69
Imposing liability on easement holders is economically efficient
under either of these theories. In some instances, easement holders are
able to spread the risk more efficiently than the owner of the fee simple, because the easement holder owns more property interests, has
more customers, or is wealthier. Utility companies or railroads, for
example, can pass on most of the risk to their customers through
higher rates. 170 Other companies can raise the prices of their goods or
buy insurance to guard against the risk. 171
Additionally, imposing liability on easement holders serves to distribute the risk by increasing the number of potentially responsible
parties. Given the possibility of joint and several liability under CERCLA, 172 the government might bring suit against only one party.
Since this party has the right to sue other parties for contribution, 173
the loss might eventually come to rest with several entities. Furthermore, in instances where the owner of the fee is just a homeowner, and
the easement holder is a utility or other company, the easement holder
might be wealthier than the owner of the fee simple estate. Thus, even
in the absence of risk spreading ability, the deep pocket theory calls for
imposing liability on these parties.
Several objections might be raised to this risk distribution analysis.
First, easement owners are not always large corporations. For example, they may be individuals with a right-of-way across their neighbor's land. Next, in the case of corporations, the costs are pa8sed on to
innocent consumers, who will be burdened, perhaps unfairly, by high
rates or costs of goods. Additionally, if the hazardous waste problem
is not caused by the easement holders, their internalizing this cost in
the form of increased prices of services or goods is an economically
inefficient allocation of costs which will lead to an inefficient distribution of goods or services. The following sections discuss these
objections.
167. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 21 (1970). In this book Calabresi popularized an economic approach to tort law which advocated placing liability on the least cost risk
avoider.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 39-40.
170. However, federal regulation of these industries might prevent them from fully recouping
these costs.
171. Presently insurance for environmental liability is almost unavailable. See Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 942, 944 (1988). However, larger companies might be able to self-insure.
172. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
173. CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988).
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The Problem of the Easement Holder with Shallow Pockets

The possibility that some easement holders may be individuals
with "shallow" pockets and a corresponding inability to spread risk
would not in itself call for abandoning easement holder liability as economically inefficient. Because the government or private party can
choose whom to sue for the cost of cleanup, 174 they will focus their
energies on pursuing those who most likely will be able to pay. 175
Thus the less wealthy easement holders probably will not incur liability in court proceedings, unless there is not another, richer, solvent
party available. If a rule of easement holder liability becomes established, however, even the poorer easement holders might be asked to
contribute to settlements. 176 In these cases their contributions quite
likely would be commensurate with their fault and ability to pay.177
These contributions, therefore, would ultimately aid in the distribution
of the loss by increasing the number of parties bearing the costs, without unfairly burdening the easement holder. Additionally, a small
easement holder could avoid even this potential loss through negotiating an indemnification agreement with the owner of the fee simple
estate.178
Furthermore, it would be senseless to formulate two rules, one for
big, corporate easement holders and one for smaller parties. Lack of
clarity in the rules leads to increased litigation and consequently to
higher transaction costs. 179 Because it is likely that the easement
holder will be at least as able to bear the loss as the landowner, assigning liability to the easement holder as well would not decrease
efficiency.
174. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988) provides for both a private and a governmental cause of action.
175. See Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5044 (1985). The EPA
has continued to rely on this interim policy statement, which it promulgated in 1985, but has
never been declared "final" in subsequent EPA pronouncements. See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. 37,892,
37,904 (1989) (to be codified at 40 CFR pt. 307) (discussing interim policy in conjunction with de
minimis settlement) (proposed Sept. 13, 1989). The interim statement sets out guidelines for the
EPA regarding CERCLA settlement procedures and briefly discusses EPA's policy with respect
to initiating litigation.
176. See CERCLA § 122(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (1988). This SARA provision encourages
prompt settlement with de minimis contributors.
177. See Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5043 (1985) (amount of
waste contributed and the party's ability to pay are factors to consider in evaluating settlement
offers).
178. Such indemnification agreements or waivers would not protect the easement holder
from direct suit by the government or private parties, see CERCLA § 107(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)
(1988), but it could allow them to recover their expenses later from the fee simple holder. or
course a large easement holder would also be able to extract such agreements, but, since they
would be a much more likely target for suit, the indemnification agreement would not be as
helpful. The fee simple owner might not have enough funds to reimburse the easement holder
without becoming insolvent.
179. Note, Toward an Optimal System ofSuccessor Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 6
STAN. ENVTL. L. REV. 226, 234 (1986-1987).
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The Fairness Argument

Although it might appear unfair that innocent customers of the
easement holder would bear the ultimate burden for pollution unrelated to the product or service they are purchasing, a further examination of the issue reveals that this really is not as inequitable as it first
seems. Rather, it is consistent with the operation of the statute. CERCLA, by incorporating the standard of strict liability, assigns liability
regardless of fault.
Pollution has become a grave societal problem. More than 20,000
waste sites with projected cleanup costs of over one hundred billion
dollars span the country. 18° Congressional expansion of the
Superfund tax base to include an excise tax on all corporations indicates recognition of hazardous waste as a problem not merely of the
petrochemical industry, but of all Americans. 181 Certainly statements
by the Senate Finance Committee suggest this viewpoint.1 82
CERCLA primarily regulates the problem of inactive waste
sites. 183 Some of these sites have been abandoned, 1s4 and the most
directly responsible parties are insolvent or cannot be found. 185 Thus,
the burden for cleanup will in any case often rest on innocent parties,
and the question then becomes which ones. The Superfund, despite its
name, remains limited. CERCLA is designed so that the four categories of "responsible" parties shoulder most of the costs. If this indirectly involves the passing on of the costs to "innocent" customers, it
seems unavoidable under the statute in its present form. The alternative would be redrafting CERCLA so that the bulk of its financing
came from general taxation. This would increase the burden of many
more innocent parties.
3.

The Substitution Problem

One commentator analyzed the "substitution problem" in his dis180. 126 CoNG. REc. 34,632 (1985).
. 181. Schwenke, Environmental Liabilities Imposed on Landowners, Tenants, and LendersHow Far Can and Should They Extend?, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10361, 10362 (Sept.
1988) (referring to the SARA amendments, 26 U.S.C. 59A).
182. See Superfund Revenue Act of 1985, Report of Mr. Packwood from the Committee on
Finance, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1985) ("Cleanup of hazardous waste cites is a broad societal
problem extending beyond the chemical and petroleum industries.").
183. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 3, at 6120.
184. Cf. 126 CoNG. REC. 26,761 (1985) (Final Report of the National Association of Attorneys General to the United States Congress on the Superfund Legislation).
185. See Lyons, Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should Superfund Liability Be Abolished?, 6
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 271, 306 (1986-1987); 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 3, at 6139 (noting that
the purpose of the Superfund is to finance the discovery and cleanup of abandonded hazardous
waste sites "when the company or companies responsible for creating the problem either no
longer exist, cannot be identified or lack the financial resources to clean up their own mess.").
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cussion of the liability of successor corporations. 186 This analysis also
applies to easement holders. Although easement holders can efficiently spread risk, allocating risk to them might distort the market by
artificially increasing the price of the easement holder's goods beyond
their social costs. 187 The possibility of liability might lead to companies purchasing easements over safer land rather than over the most
direct route. This inefficient choice would cause the products of the
company to reflect the risk of hazardous waste liability, even when this
risk is not part of their production cost. Additionally, if the company
is risk averse it will pay even more to avoid risk than would be necessary statistically, and thus lead to further inefficiencies. This type of
misallocation of costs is known as the substitution problem.
Nevertheless, such allocative inefficiencies seem unavoidable. Ideally, pollution costs should be absorbed by the generator of the pollution. Her products would then reflect their true costs. If the polluter
is known and solvent the loss will eventually come to rest at least partially with her, either through direct suit by ~he government or private
parties or through a suit for contribution.1 88 Thus, the only case in
which the full loss will fall on a nonpolluter will be in the event of
unavailability or insolvency of the polluter. In this instance, in order
to minimize economic inefficiency, the government would have to fund
the cleanup. 189 Then the cost and thus the availability of such products as electricity would only be slightly altered.
CERCLA, however, seeks to have private parties finance the
cleanup wherever possible. 190 Additionally, even if the government
could distribute the cost more widely through such devices as taxation, the bureaucratic waste and inefficiencies which such a system
could entail might counterbalance the economic good of this broader
and more equitable distribution ofloss.1 91 In the end, placing the burden on private industry might be more efficient.
V.

AN EXAMPLE

This Note has asserted that in instances in which easement holders
186. Note, supra note 179, at 239-41. The analysis in this section is largely based on the
arguments of this commentator.
187. Social costs refer to the costs attributable to production or acquisition of a product. For
example, if in producing a good, one pollutes the atmosphere, the cost of preventing this pollution is part of the social cost of the good.
188. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
189. Nevertheless even a tax applied to all would still be inefficient since many would be
paying a price unrelated to the social cost of their goods. However, if the cost is spread over
enough people the allocative inefficiencies would diminish.
190. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
191. See generally s. RHOADS, THE EcONOMIST'S VIEW OF THE WORLD 69-71 (1985)
(describing studies documenting the relative inefficiency of government agencies as compared
with private business).

March 1991]

Note -

Easement Holders Under CERCLA

1263

exercise sufficient control over the land subject to the easement they
should incur liability as owners under CERCLA. Section A of this
Part gives an example of the type of situation envisioned. Section B
then concludes that while imposing liability in this example follows
logically from the analysis of this Note, the result might be harsher
than warranted. This Part proposes a solution which eases the burden
on easement holders with widespread property interests, while not relieving them of their responsibilities as owners.

A. Liability
This section argues that an electric company holding an easement
to install and maintain electric wires meets the owner criteria for liability under CERCLA. An electric company generally obtains an
easement for the use of a 10 or 15 foot strip ofland along the edge of a
subdivision. 192 The rights of the electric company sometimes include
the ability to "install, operate, maintain and remove, from time to
time, facilities used in connection with overhead and underground
transmission and distribution of electricity and sounds and signals in,
over, under across, along and upon the surface of the property." 193 To
carry out these responsibilities the electric company may enter the
property, and can remove or trim trees or branches as necessary. Additionally, the fee simple owner may not place obstructions on the land
subject to the easement or change the grade of the property without
the electric company's consent.194
An agreement such as the one described above gives the easement
holder significant rights in terms of use of the property, and simultaneously restricts the fee simple owner's ability to use the land. The easement holder not only has access to the surface of the land subject to
the easement, but can use the air space above and the ground below.
Although the agreement limits the easement holder's control over the
property to tasks associated with the transmission of electricity and
the maintenance of electric facilities, this grant of power nevertheless
equals or exceeds that of easement holders who have been held liable
as owners under the common law.
For example, the defendant in Green v. Duke Power Co. had a similar contract with the fee simple owner to allow the installation and
maintenance of its electric lines and transformers. 195 Because of the
limitations placed on the fee simple owner's power to control access to
the area around the transformer and the power company's greater
ability to exclude others, the Duke Power court suggested that the
192. Conversation with Terry Davis, employee of Commonwealth Edison Company (Mar.
11, 1991).
193. Commonwealth Edison Company, easement provisions.
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
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power company would be the party responsible for a girl's injury from
touching the transformer.196
The test applied by some courts in assessing whether someone
should be liable as an owner under CERCLA parallels that employed
by some courts considering owner liability under tort law. 197 The ability to prevent the accident or to rectify the problem once it has occurred indicates sufficient control to qualify as an owner.1 98 The
electric company in the hypothetical example could prevent the accumulation of hazardous waste on the land subject to the easement by
monitoring the property and reporting any problems to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, the easement holder could detect any
hazardous waste already on the property and clean it up. Although
the contract does not explicitly grant this power, it follows from the
easement holder's ability to maintain its power lines. Just as a holder
of a right-of-way has the right, indeed the duty, to repair the path, the
electric company at minimum possesses the right to prevent its equipment from contamination by hazardous wastes. Thus the electric
company would meet the criteria for ownership under this test.
Additionally, compared with the broad range of nontraditional
owners such as lenders, lessees, shareholders, and parent corporations,
the electric company comes closest to the traditional concept of an
owner as well as the concept of an owner under CERCLA. Unlike
lenders, shareholders, or parent corporations, the electric company
possesses rights over the land itself. CERCLA defines an owner as one
who owns a facility. 199 The definition of facility encompasses physical
entities such as a building or a h~dous waste site, 200 and does not
refer to a company or corporation. Thus lenders or shareholders only
could meet the criteria of owners indirectly, by controlling a corporation which is an owner under the Act. In contrast, an easement holder
such as the electric company directly fulfills the requirements.Finally, the electric company has deep pockets and vast holdings.
Making this type of easement holder responsible as an owner under
196. Although in this instance the object directly causing the injury belonged to the easement
holder, this relationship is not a prerequisite for holding easement holders liable as owners. See
generally Part II. Instead courts have focused on the easement holder's control over the area. In
fact, courts have found easement holders potentially liable for acts only indirectly related to the
physical property, such as death caused by a heart attack brought on by abduction from an unlit
parking lot. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. In other words, for the purposes of tort
law, courts treat easement holders as owners of real property, not only as owners of personal
property, fixtures, or other objects causing injury.
197. See supra notes 97 & 99 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing the California Tort Claims Act
Test); see also supra notes 155 & 156 and accompanying text (describing the test used by courts
ln the CERCLA context and proposing a modification to this test).
199. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
200. CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988).
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CERCLA would further the policy goals of risk spreading and monitoring discussed in Part III.
B. Defense

Although the arguments contained in this Note point to the electric company's liability as an owner under CERCLA, this result seems
draconian, even considering the harshness of CERCLA. An electric
company might hold tens of thousands of miles of easements, and a
hazardous waste site crossing any of these tracts could render the
company jointly and severally liable.201 A few such discoveries would
quickly empty deep pockets.
In Sowers v. Tri-County Telephone Co., 202 the Indiana Supreme
Court suggested a solution to this dilemma. The Sowers court determined that an easement holder, a telephone company, was a possessor
according to the Restatement's definition. 203 The case involved the
telephone company's duties to a tree trimmer, who was injured when
he fell into an abandoned manhole. The court, however, took into
consideration that the company was a nontraditional owner. In particular, the court recognized that the telephone company, unlike a typical owner, might not come onto the property for years at a time. 204
The court held that requiring the telephone company to inspect its
easements regularly, in order to warn business invitees of possible
hazards, would be too· great a burden, and its duty should relate to
actual use. 205
CERCLA's innocent landowner defense2° 6 can introduce similar
flexibility into CERCLA. Landowners are not eligible for this defense
if they have actual or constructive knowledge of the hazardous waste
build-up. 207 Generally courts have determined that, in order to come
within the ambits of the innocent landowner defense, landowners must
thoroughly investigate prior to purchasing the land. Otherwise they
can be charged with constructive knowledge of the hazardous waste
problem. 208 The courts could consider what knowledge they can fairly
impute to the easement holder.
The courts could establish a different duty of care for easement
holders such as the electric company who must acquire vast tracts of
201. See supra notes 42-43.
202. 546 N.E.2d 836 (Ind. 1989).
203. 546 N.E.2d at 838.
204. 546 N.E.2d at 838.
205. 546 N.E.2d at 839 ("To the extent that Tri-County learned of dangerous conditions
near its poles through these visits, of course, it had a duty to warn future invitees.").
206. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
208. F. GRAD, supra note 14, § 4A.02, at 4A-46.3 (noting courts' narrow interpretation of
the defense).
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easements in order to conduct business. The courts could limit such a
company's duty to investigate to high risk areas, for example where
the easement crosses a chemical plant's property. In this manner the
electric company could effectively monitor its easements for the most
likely hazards without facing onerous burdens and liabilities. 209
The text of the innocent landowners exception supports such a
flexible approach. The statute advocates considering various factors
such as the "specialized knowledge" of the landowner, "the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information
about the property," the difficulty of detecting contamination, and
"the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at
the property."210 By attaching appropriate weight to these conditions
and construing them in light of the special difficulties faced by companies such as the electric company, the easement holder's duty of care
could be reduced to the standard advocated above.
CONCLUSION

Extending owner liability under CERCLA to easement holders exerting sufficient control over land conforms with the Act's legislative
history. This extension also follows logically from CERCLA decisions
in other areas as well as from the treatment of easement holders under
the common law. Furthermore, policy considerations for site monitoring and risk spreading justify the imposition of liability on easement
holders.
Countervailing considerations, however, reveal the need for a discriminating approach. Otherwise, public services such as utilities
209. The innocent landowner defense provides incentive for monitoring current as well as
prospective holdings. Only those who exercise "due care with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned" and take "precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any ••. third party"
can invoke the defense. See CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). When considering
the potential liability of an easement holder such as the electric company, courts can read ftexibil·
ity into this part of the defense as well. They can construe "foreseeable" narrowly and consist·
ently with the duty of care proposed above for this type of easement holder.
If the third party creating the new hazardous waste problem is the fee simple owner, however, the easement holder probably could not use the defense, because a contractual relationship
exists between him and the owner of the fee, and the hazardous disposal occurred after the
acquisition of the easement. See CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). On the other
hand, many of the fee simple owners who dump hazardous waste probably also are engaged in
high risk businesses, and this Note proposes that the easement holder should have the duty to
monitor risky areas. Thus, the restriction on the potential protection of easement holders
through the innocent landowner defense is not as severe as it first appears.
210. CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B). SARA's House Conference Report
further notes that the standard of inquiry depends upon the public awareness of the hazardous
waste problem at the time of acquisition of the land. H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess.
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3276, 3280. Taking into account
public awareness at the time of acquisition will decrease the chance of easement holders incurring
liability for hazardous waste sites they unwittingly acquired before CERCLA even was enacted.
A discussion of CERCLA's retroactivity, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
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could soon find themselves facing financial ruin, even while attempting
to respond responsibly to the problem of inactive hazardous waste
sites. In many instances, their holdings would prove too expansive to
monitor or to insure without incurring prohibitive expense. A liberal
interpretation of the innocent landowner defense would ease the burden on the utility companies while still providing incentive for them to
monitor for hazardous wastes in appropriate instances.
This Note proposes a flexible standard for easement holder liability. Easement holders with extensive holdings which they seldom visit
should only have a duty to investigate property on which it is reasonably likely that a hazardous waste problem exists. The easement holders could base the determination of this likelihood on information
regarding the history of the property. On the other hand, easement
holders with more limited holdings whose actual contact with the
property is greater should have to meet the standard of a fee simple
owner in order to be eligible for the innocent landowner defense. Such
a sliding scale approach to the duty of care acknowledges that, even if
the control threshold necessary for ownership liability is met, the easement holder's relationship to the land may differ from that of a fee
simple owner.
-
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